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Conf held in London UK 12-13 March 1992. Papers are - Understanding HSE's expectations for the offshore industry The influence of certifying authorities on offshore safety The practicalities of conducting formal safety assessments in line with the Cullen Report recommendations Some practicalities of safety case implementation Maximising your platform safety through effective design and safety management systems The temporary safe refuge concept Specification and implementation of temporary safe refuges and their associated means of escape and evacuation Rationalising the costs and benefits of safety related modifications Structural design for effective blast and fire resistance Improving safety through early gas detection Methods and options for improving fire protection How automatic the safety system Making unmanned platforms a viable safety option

An attempt to fully integrate the safety management system with risk analysis and safety critical elements is described in the paper. In the approach the safety critical elements are viewed as hazard barriers designed to prevent hazard release and if an incident is reached as the defences against escalation. Therefore they can be incorporated into the quantitative risk assessment as branches in event trees. By identifying management tasks that ensure barriers and defences are operational at all times and incorporating those into the safety management system full integration or ‘hard’ coupling between the safety management system and hazard barriers and defences is achieved.

In the petroleum industry there has been a high focus on the risk of major hazards. Statoil is an operator of some 20 plus offshore production platforms in the North Sea with major pipeline systems carrying gas to continental Europe and onshore facilities such as gas separation facilities and refineries. As such it is vitally important for Statoil to have a clear picture of the safety condition of its facilities. In order to ensure a high safety performance Statoil has developed a method for mapping and monitoring the technical safety level. This method is based on a set of performance standards specifying functional integrity (availability) and survivability requirements. The technical safety condition has been mapped for 21 of Statoil's offshore production installations and 9 onshore plants and receiving terminals. The conditions for each are described relative to more than 200 requirements each checked by performing 3-20 examination activities. Results are shown using grades for each performance requirement and indicators for each installation. The indicators change when gaps are closed and new reviews are performed. Another technical safety indicator reflects the performance of selected safety critical equipment-components. This allows trending and means for early intervention as well as an opportunity for optimisation maintenance and function tests (intervals). The overall impression is that most of the systems fulfil acceptable safety performance and will in general prevent or mitigate a major hazardous incident.95386 System for mono- and bistatic sonar investigation of buried objects

Aspects of industrial safety in the large integrated power system of the CEGB discussed including - management policy; policy statement outlining responsibilities of managers and employees; policy implementation; plant design for safety; concepts of `general safety' and `safety from the system'; review and maintenance of safety standards using technical and safety audits and accident investigations; role of the Health and Safety Executive.

The safety and health of seafarers is protected by an impressive framework of conventions and legislation. The purpose of this manual is to highlight the basic principles which the framework contains and help seafarers put them into practice. The manual covers the responsibilities, structure and procedures of the shipboard safety system, tools for improving safety, health on board (including hygiene, hazardous substances and infectious diseases), safety and health training, reviewing safety and health on board and the human factor - safety culture and understanding accidents.

Conf held 22-23 October 1991 in Aberdeen Papers are Understanding HSE's expectations for the offshore industry The influence of certifying authorities on offshore safety The practicalities of conducting formal safety assessments in line with the Cullen report recommendations Getting to grips with the safety case - developing a co-ordinated safety programme Maximising your platform safety through effective design and safety management systems Practical suggestions for providing temporary safe refuge on new and existing platforms Incorporating accessible escape and evacuation routes cost-effectively Rationalizing the costs and benefits of safety related modifications Structural design for effective blast and fire resistance Improving safety through early gas detection Methods and options for improving fire protection How automatic the safety system Operators and contractors - best strategies for securing safety together

A newly developed methodology is presented which uses the quantitative risk analysis of hazardous events on an offshore installation to determine the safety criticality of both hardware and software systems. This allows the production of PFEER (Performance Standards for Safety Critical Systems as required by the Safety Case Legislation and Prevention of Fire Explosion and Emergency Response Regulation). A combination of event trees and flow logic are used to assess the contribution of any specific system to the AFR (annual fatality rate) for a range of hazardous events such as gas release jet fire pool fire explosion etc. for different areas of the installation. This provides a selection process for determining if a system is safety critical and enables performance standards to be produced that are based on quantified risks. Tables diagrams and graphs appear on pages 12 to 16.

The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations (SI 1992 No 2885) are the first of new 'goal setting' regulations under the Health and Safety at Work Act; they have a broad set of objectives and are supported by an Approved Code of Practice (ACoP). Safety cases are concerned with potential major accident hazards and should include sufficient particulars to demonstrate that all hazards have been identified and that the risks have been evaluated and minimised. Once a Safety Case had been accepted it becomes the formal management document for the Offshore Safety Division of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Safety Case submissions should include descriptions diagrams the philosophy behind the final layout evidence of stability and watertightness details of the mooring system the risks involved with shipping water on deck details of cargo offloading systems details of structures and materials and accident and incident history.

Conf held 22 November 1990 in London Papers are North Sea safety-the record to date The Cullen Report lessons learned and recommendations The offshore industry's response to Lord Cullen's recommendations Formal safety assessments Good management is the key to offshore safety Building safety into a project Designing for safety Developments in evacuation and escape The economic implications of safety

This booklet is provided as a service to owners and charterers of gas carrying vessels and to terminals to which such vessels operate, with the purpose of promoting further safety in marine operations. Part A : the Safety Inspection Guidelines for Gas Carriers are offered as a guide for the assessment of the safety of gas carriers. Part B : the Terminal Safety Check List for Gas Carriers is offered for use before and during cargo handling.

Conf held 1-2 December 1993 in London UK. Papers are - Background content and future plans for the safety case regime A comparison of UK and Netherlands offshore safety cases Implementing cost-effective safety - with goal setting regulation helping the offshore workforce Audit and the living safety cases Workforce involvement in safety case development Identification and assessment of safety systems in safety cases An update of the Norwegian regime for offshore safety Life after the acceptance of safety cases Continuous improvement through effective management systems Multimedia tools applied to the safety case A simulation approach to crisis management training Information access and retrieval for the offshore oil and gas industry - the technological approach Developments in gaseous firefighting agents and systems Maintenance of a living QRA

NOTE - This is a BMT duplicated conference holding thus papers abstracted in Chap 26 are: Improving the understanding of ship safety management Safety cases for in-service ships Environmental management systems for minimising risk and liability for naval facilities and vessels The classification process and the safety case for naval ships War peace and risk Safety management in the submarine flotilla Ship safety cases - a prime contractors perspective Integrated Vanguard class submarine safety management Guidance to safety in weapon system procurement Safety management on the LPD(R) design and build contract Operational risk management in the United States Navy The U.S. Coast Guard's deepwater project assuring maritime safety and security for the 21st century A tool to assist in the tracking of failures and the identification ofsignificant failure sequences for submarine safety The safe design of a 90m trimaran

Int Seminar held by RINA 7-8 May 1992 in London. Papers are - An overview of the implementation and development of safety standards Towards rational regulation Nordic cooperative research on safety of high-speed vessels in waves High-speed craft operations Ship motions and passenger safety Integrated safety - a new approach to improved safety in high- speed navigation The high-speed craft integrated bridge and its contribution to safety Safety for high-speed passenger craft - the way ahead Proposal for Annex IV of IMO Code for High-Speed Craft The application of aerospace safety and reliability analysis techniques to high-speed marine transport The development of fire safety requirements for high-speed craft

Safety assessment methodologies have undergone rapid changes over the last five years partly because of a number of high-profile accidents and partly because the need for more rigorous assessment has been recognised. Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) has now become an integral part of any hazardous project and the disciplines required for this have impacted prime contract management. FSA requires a safety case to be produced for the complete life cycle of equipment and mandates the contractor to explore all hazards from first principles and then implement safety mitigation strategies. Safety responsibility therefore rests firmly with the prime contractor. The implementation of the safety case is discussed in terms of key personnel including the safety manager and the safety auditor. Methods to overcome possible problems for example with customer or project team interfaces are presented.

It becomes gradually accepted that safety factors and design values in codes of practice should be calculated from sensitivity factors and safety indices. Currently this is not always the case and a continuing effort is going on to make codes consistent with this basic philosophy. A clear way to show the discrepancy between theory and codes is to compute the safety indices directly from a set of safety factors. The paper presents a simple method for this and demonstrates it on a number of examples showing that structural safety realized in practice varies considerably.

The "safety case" approach which includes Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is described. It has been adopted by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) as the most appropriate form of safety regulation in an area where the traditional approach to regulation is not appropriate or cost effective. The High Speed Craft Code (HSC code) and the British Hovercraft Safety Requirements have been adopted for operational aspects and construction aspects respectively. Five stages to safe operation are tabulated.

Several initiatives are under way to improve safety levels in all aspects of ship design and operation. A common theme is the proposed adoption of structured safety management systems and associated techniques. The design phase is the most cost-effective for introducing safety features. The key steps in the safety management process are hazard identification risk evaluation development of a risk management plan implementation of the plan and risk monitoring. The goals for each step are also described. Examples of ways to achieve these goals are provided and some of the interfaces with operational safety management are highlighted.

The management of ship safety is based on an estimation of navigational risk. This is calculated as a combination of the probability of an accident and its consequence. The risk is applied as a safety measure. The application of risk estimation methods allows the safety level to be determined quantitatively. Mainly it is used to support the marine engineering decision process. The methods of estimating ship safety using proper criteria measures and rates are presented. These allow the safety level to be estimated quantitatively. These methods are used to solve many marine problems. An example is presented.

The concept of safety culture is investigated to identify some of the elements that characterise strong safety cultures. The ISM code's aims and objectives are revisited and its paradigm is explained. The roots of safety culture are explored. The importance of corporate culture and the co-dependence of safety safety culture and corporate culture are described. General factors influencing culture are examined followed by organisational factors that influence culture. The importance of organisational learning in maintaining a sustainable competitive advantage and in nurturing innovation is discussed. Characteristics of organisational learning are tabulated. Finally factors influencing individuals' culture are described.

An historical account examines in detail the development of International Conventions concerned with the Safety Of Life At Sea beginning with the first and largely unenacted SOLAS 1914 and the subsequent SOLAS 1929 which set fundamental aspects of safety in a Convention structure of chapters and articles and continuing through the provisions of SOLAS 48 and SOLAS 60 to SOLAS 74 which together with its Chapter II amendments is the basis of current safety. Major vessels built during this time are used to illustrate significant advances in safety technology particularly concerning life saving equipment fire safety systems and stability.