

THE LOSS OF THE CALDER**Findings of the Board of
Trade Inquiry****"OVERWHELMED BY A HEAVY SEA"**

From Our Own Correspondent

HULL, Friday

The findings in the Board of Trade Inquiry at Hull into the loss of the Goole steamer *Calder*, with 18 hands, after leaving Hamburg on Apr. 17, were announced to-day by the President, Mr. J. R. MacDonald.

The Court found that there was no conclusive evidence as to the actual cause of the loss of the vessel, but they considered the most probable cause was that the vessel was overwhelmed by a heavy sea which carried away unsecured hatches aft and partially flooded the bridge space. This very quickly destroyed her stability, so that she capsized and sank in the North Sea about eight to ten miles to the westward of the Outer Dowsing Lightship about 5 a.m. on Apr. 19.

In answer to questions asked by the Board of Trade, the Court found that the late Captain T. W. Sutherby had been in command of the *Calder* for six days before she sailed from Hamburg. No special written or verbal instructions were given to the master when he joined the vessel or at Hamburg. A book of stability diagrams was included in the ship's papers, which showed the stability under 14 conditions of loading. They were selected by Captain Sutherby when he superintended the building of the vessel. No maximum amount of deck cargo was contemplated in the stability data furnished to the master, and he was not instructed not to exceed any maximum. There was no necessity for him to be given any such instructions.

CARGO PROPERLY STOWED

The master was responsible for deciding the total amount of cargo to be shipped, and the amount to be carried on deck, and he was responsible for the manner in which the cargo was stowed at Hamburg. There were 761 tons of cargo below deck and 200 tons on deck. The cargo was securely and properly stowed. Proper and sufficient steps were taken to keep the scuppers and freeing ports clear of the deck cargo when it was stowed, but the Court could not say whether or not similar steps were taken to ensure that the scuppers and freeing ports were fully efficient for their intended purpose.

The metacentric height of the vessel when she left Hamburg was between .84 and .91 ft. Having regard to type and design of vessel and her lading, this metacentric height was sufficient for the intended voyage on the assumption that no considerable body of water would get into the bridge space. If, however, such body of water did get into the bridge space the metacentric height would not be sufficient to ensure safety.

When the *Calder* left Hamburg she was upright and in good and seaworthy condition as regards hull and equipment and was properly supplied with boats, life-saving appliances and distress signals. Hatches were covered and adequately and properly secured. The vessel behaved normally during the time the pilot was on board, her behaviour being satisfactory from the point of view of stability.

WRECKAGE IDENTIFIED

The *Calder* was not sighted nor were distress signals seen from her after she dropped her pilot. A boat and other wreckage washed up on the Lincolnshire coast belonged to the *Calder*. The loss of the vessel was not caused or contributed to by the wrongful act or default of the owners, the London Midland & Scottish Railway Company, or of any of the other parties to the inquiry, or by any of them.

The President, on behalf of the assessors and himself, expressed sympathy with those who had been left by the gallant men who were blotted out of existence so rapidly and apparently so unexpectedly in this dreadful disaster, and asked that the sympathy of the Court be conveyed to the relatives.



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