

M/S. "TRICOLOR".

EXTRACT OF LOG.

Rangoon, Tuesday 28th February, 1956.

East, nearly no wind, clear, plus 24 degrees C.

0000 hrs. - The loading was continued with 2 gangs in the same hatches. In hatch No.2 - 1 gang from 0000 - 0050; cotton for Rotterdam.
" " No.3 - 1 gang from 0000 - 0210; cotton for Genoa.

Same watch on deck and in the cargo holds. Third officer duty on deck.

At 0210 hrs. completed loading in hatch No.3, gang ashore and loading in Rangoon thus completed.

Loaded upto 0210 hrs. 59 tons.

Previously loaded 2191 "

Total cargo loaded in Rangoon 2250 tons.

Total cargo on board 8416 tons.

Draft at 0700 hrs: F. 27'4" A.27'4"

At 0700 hrs the crew commenced making the vessel ready for sea. Between 0800 hrs and 0830 hrs the beam on the second section was put on in No.3. A.B. Harald Olufsen was down in No.3 hatch and brought up some slings. The hatch-covers were then put on and battened down. At 0945 hrs the steward came and reported to the Captain that smoke was coming up in the pantry; at the same time the Chief Officer came running and reported that smoke was coming up from No.3 forepart port side. Fire-hoses were made ready, fire-extinguishers were ordered to No.3. Through radio, the fire brigade and the agents were warned. Fire-signals were given. All ventilators were ordered to be covered. At 1000 hrs. the Chief Engineer was ordered to open on the flasks containing CO2 leading to cargo-holds 2 and 3 lower holds and lower tween-deck. As the fire appeared to be on the port side, forepart in No.3 Shelterdeck, one hatch-cover was removed. The hatch was full of smoke, and it was impossible to get down into the hold. The fire-extinguisher was directed against the fire from the deck - as the extinguishers were emptied, fire-hoses were gradually taken into use. Attempts were made to go down into the afterpart of the hatch. The smoke was not so thick here, but all the same it was impossible to stay down there for any length of time in order to go forward in the hold, as the heat of the fire was unbearable. The hatch-cover was then put on again in the afterpart, and we concentrated from the fore-part of the hatch to direct the water-hoses in under the deck and onto the jute cargo in the fore-part and also onto the port side of the Shelterdeck, as the fire appeared to be in that part.

Some time later, it was checked in No.2 hatch whether there should be any smoke in this hatch. It was free from smoke. At 1030 hrs. another check was made in No.2. Flames were now observed in the jute on the port side in the Shelterdeck innermost in the alleyway underneath the deck. Fire-extinguishers and water-hoses were immediately brought to this spot and directed against the fire. Shortly afterwards, flames were also observed in the jute on the starboard side in the Lower tweendeck in the alleyway underneath the deck. At 1045 hrs. we got assistance from shore and more hoses were brought to No.2 and 3 hatches. In order to get at the fire better with their hoses, the fire-brigade removed several hatch-covers and used all the hoses they had. In the meantime reinforcements with more hoses were coming from shore. There were ~~two~~ two boats alongside pumping in water. In order to get better access to the fire, a hole was made in the deck on the portside in the fore-part alleyway No.3 Shelterdeck, and another hole outside the portside saloon door into the forepart of the Shelterdeck. Water

hoses were put down into these holes and water poured into the deck. The holes were covered by tarpaulins. 18 fire-hoses were in use for extinguishing the fire in No.2 and 3.

Owing to all the water being pumped in, the vessel started listing heavily as all the water was shifting over to the starboard side, complicating the extinguishing of the fire. The engine's pumps were discharging water continuously from engine room and hold No.4.

It was then decided to beach the vessel. At 1805 hrs. let go from No.3 Hastings buoy. The extinguishing of the fire was continued with the vessel's fire-hoses. Owing to the list, only portside engine could be used. The vessel was steered from the poop as the electrical wires leading up to the bridge were burnt out. Master Attendant for the Board of Management for the Port of Rangoon, Mr. Berry, and the Captain were manoeuvring the vessel from the top bridge. The vessel was beached 5 nautical miles from Hastings on Liffey Sands. The ship beached nicely at 1905 hrs. in 25' in northerly direction on highwater. At 1908 let the port anchor fall, about 30 fathoms. At 1910 the fire-tugs came alongside. At 1922 hrs. finished with engines. At 1950 the fire-brigade commenced extinguishing the fire again. The following holes were made in the deck to facilitate the fire-extinguishing:
 Port side to Shelterdeck alleyway - 2 openings
 Starboard side " " - 2 "
 Starboard side of No.3 hatch - 1 opening where hoses were put down. During the night, the afterpart of the vessel swung strongly over to port side and got the tide abeam.

Rangoon, Wednesday 29th February, 1956.

South-West wind, very little, clear, 23 degrees C.

The extinguishing in these hatches went on during the whole night. We were optimistic in hoping to limit the fire to No.2 and 3 hatches and save No.1, deep-tanks engine-room and hatches 4-5-6. In order to get better access with the hoses in the deck, further openings were made in the deck:

On the foredeck just in afterpart of the bulkhead to No.1 hatch on starboard side.

The same was done on the port side. Hoses were put down the openings and water put on against the flames raging in the shelter-deck.

During the afternoon, the vessel started listing more to starboard; at about 1500 hrs. the vessel's pumps could not produce water on deck. One of the boats alongside pumped water into the portside deeptank in order to straighten up the ship.

List about 7 - 8 degrees. As we did not succeed in straightening up the vessel, and the list increased, the crew were brought off the ship and on board a tug which was alongside. At 1840 hrs. the crew was off the ship. The fire-brigade left the vessel at the same time, entering down into the fire-boats and cutting their fire-hoses, as everyone expected the ship to turn round any minute. The Master and the Third Officer (voluntarily) remained on board. At about 1930 hrs. there was a heavy movement in the vessel as it was heeling over to about 17-20 degrees starboard; the flames increased in No.2 and 3. By flashlight we tried to get contact with the Harbour Master to stand by and to telegraph the Owners and the Agents about the position. We got contact, and a launch came close. The Master requested to get contact with the Harbour Master.

The Master was informed that he could go on board the Harbour Master's tug "NATHAMEE" to clear things up. On the condition that he should be put on board again, the Master and the 3rd Officer left the ship. Telegrams were sent to the Owners and the Agents regarding the position. At 2215, the Master, Chief Officer and the Chief Engineer were brought back on board the "TRICOLOR". The situation was unchanged.

About 2230 hrs. Lloyd's Surveyor came alongside and asked the Captain if he wanted to stay on board, who replied in the affirmative. Lloyd's Surveyor offered us to stand by in their boat, as the vessel's list was so critical that the ship might turn over entirely when the tide shifted. (Low water at about 0200 hrs.) It was agreed to stand by the vessel in Lloyd's Surveyor's boat, awaiting developments. Left the vessel at 2300 hrs.

Rangoon, Thursday 1st March, 1956.

Changeable, very little wind, hazy.

At 0240 hrs. the Master, Chief Officer, Chief Engineer and Lloyd's Surveyor went on board the "TRICOLOR". The vessel had then started breaking in two at No.3 hatch, forepart of deeptank.

At 0330 hrs. left the vessel and were standing by.

At 0700 hrs. went on board the "FIREFLY" which came alongside and continued extinguishing the fire with fire-nozzles at hatch No.2, the bridge and No.3 hatch. The bunker oil at No.2 hatch had now started burning. Large flames and black smoke. At 0910 hrs. the Master went on board the "TRICOLOR" and collected the crew's passports from the crew's quarters aft. At 0944 hrs. the "FIREFLY" went to bunker. The Master, Chief Officer and the Chief Engineer went over into another boat. At 1100 hrs. went on board the "FIREFLY" again. At 1106 hrs. "FIREFLY" alongside "TRICOLOR" and continued extinguishing the fire. The vessel was then hogbroken in the forepart of the deeptanks; the afterpart and the bow sinking deeper into the water. From 1420 hrs. the extinguishing of the fire was further complicated by strong tide.

At 1622 hrs. the water went over the bulwark of the foredeck. At 1650 hrs. the fire extinguishing ceased.

At 1750 hrs. the bunker oil from No.3 tank started burning, causing violent flames in the deeptank.

The fire now spread to the engine-room and to No.1 hatch. At 2107 hrs. the oil started to pour into the sea from the breakage at hatch No.3. Enormous mast high flames from the forepart amid-ships to the bow.

At 2120 hrs. violent flames from the engine room.

At 2125 the clearing-tanks exploded.

Rangoon, Friday 2nd March, 1956.

No wind, fog.

Owing to dense fog, from 0440 hrs. to 0730 hrs. the vessel was invisible. At 0620 hrs. a loud explosion was heard and some oil came down towards us. At 0730 hrs. we approached the ship and observed violent flames from No.4 hatch.

The boat "TRUSTY" now took over to stand by "TRICOLOR" with 3rd Mate Nocolai Jacobsen on board.

2nd Mate and 3rd Mate changed standing by the ship.

The Master, Chief Officer and Chief Engineer daily down to the vessel.



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M/V "TRICOLOR".

Rangoon, 2nd March, 1956.

The following are corrections and additions to the extract of the log.

Just after departure from Hastings Buoy at 1805 hours Starboard Engine became ready for use.

On the way down before the ship was grounded the oil was trimmed from No.2 Starboard Tank to No.1 Tank and to Portside No.5 Tank. This straightened the ship so that it was straight when it beached on Liffey Sands.

The decision to beach the vessel in order to facilitate the extinguishing of the fire was taken in consultation with and under advice from the Master Attendant, Mr. Berry, Lloyd's Surveyor, Mr. Dunn and the Ship's Agent.



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